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Abstract 
In this paper, we construct a new measurement of sectoral concentration of credit portfolios--risk-adjusted HHI. This 
measurement takes systematic risk of different sectors into consideration by weighting them with their betas. This paper 
investigates the effects of sectoral concentration isk using panel data on 16 Chinese listed 
commercial banks during the 2007-2011 period and compares the results of the new measurement with those of more 
conventional measure HHI. We find that sectoral concentration is associated with higher risk, and our new measurement 
performs well to capture the change of systematic risk of sectors and exposures to sectors at the same time. Our analysis 
may provide important implication for regulators and policy makers of the banks in developing markets. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates 
banking system from the aspect of sector. In real world, we observe both diversification and concentration 
strategies. On one hand, several countries possess rules limiting a borrower [1], 
involve in sectors which they have expertise and enjoy comparative advantages. Subprime crisis, in the year 
2008, which later lead to global financial crisis is partly due to too much exposures to real estate industry which 
is highly related to macro economy [2]. This crisis, caused by credit portfolio concentration, in return, hit the 
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whole banking industry of US heavily. In the light of financial crisis, diversification versus concentration has 
become one of the most important issues to be discussed concerning financial stability. 
Should banks diversify their loans or concentrate on those firms whose business they are familiar with? 
There are some research works on the relationship between diversification and performance of banks, however 
there is no consensus so far, because findings of different countries vary, with evidences supporting both 
opinions. 
On one hand, traditional banking theory suggests that banks should diversify their loans to decrease credit 
risk, which is also in accordance with portfolio theory [3]. The view is due to asymmetric information; 
diversification reduces financial intermediation costs [4]. In practice, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  
reported that many banking crises in the last three decades were caused by concentration, indicating that risk is 
highly associated with diversification [5]. Empirical studies in Argentina [6] and Austria [7] are in favor of this 
point of view. 
On the other hand, corporate finance theory states that firms would enjoy additional benefits resulting from 
reduced cost if they concentrate their activities on specific sectors which they have expertise in or are familiar 
with [8]. In addition, the diversification strategy is less attractive because it also induces competition (Winton 
1999). Empirical evidence can be found to support this argument in Italian banking sector [7], German banking 
sector [9], Brazilian banking sector [10] and small European banks [11]. 
We summarize the existing empirical studies on this issue in Table 1. Country studied, sample period, type 
of diversification and main findings are listed respectively. 
However, the existing literatures on diversification versus concentration are heavily concentrated in US and 
Europe markets. Only few works were about developing markets including Brazil and Argentina. As one of the 
biggest and fastest-growing emerging economies in the world, China has been playing an utmost important role 
in world economy. To the best of our knowledge, however, only Berger, Hasan and Zhou investigated this 
issue in Chinese banking sector from the geographical and loans, deposit and assets diversification leaving the 
field much unexamined [13]. 
Chinese banks had been heavily influenced by policy makers and did not pay attention to sectoral 
diversification in the past. Each bank has its own position in the banking system, and produced its expertise on 
some certain sectors. They were often required by policy makers to direct their loans (such as policy loans) to 
the sectors they are expertise on before 1990s. Such restrictions gradually disappeared in the latter half of the 
1990s, and now most of the banks are involved in all the industries including farming, forestry, husbandry and 
fishing; mining; manufacturing, production and supply of electric power, gas and water; construction; 
transportation and warehousing; information technology; wholesale and retail trade; finance and insurance; real 
estate; social service (including science, education and health); communication and culture, etc. Question arises 
that whether they should diversify across the industries or specialize in one or few sectors? Will concentration 
on real estate bring higher risk just as US? 
The primary goal of this paper is to analyze how credit portfolio sectoral concentration affects Chinese bank 
risk, which is different from previous work of Chinese banking system focusing on overall diversification [13]. 
This work has direct consequences to financial regulation and policy makers in this largest emerging economy, 
for the reason that, in China, regulators and policy makers can incentivize or set limit on exposures of certain 
sectors to ensure Chinese financial stability. 
An important contribution of our work is that we do not only consider sectoral concentration, but also 
systematic risk of sectors themselves. Concentration does associate with risk, but concentration on those sectors 
which are more volatile and closely related with economic upturns and downturns brings more risk. To address 
the problem, we construct a new concentration measurement, taking systematic risk of different sectors into 
consideration by weighting them with their betas. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our methodology, defining the 
variables of interest and the empirical models. Our data will be described in details in Section 3. Section 4 
displays our empirical results and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Methodology 
2.1.  Concentration Measures 
Previous research works applied several commonly-used traditional concentration measures including 
Hirschman-Herfindhl (HHI) [9,13] and the Shannon Entropy (SE) [10,12]. Some of the papers also use 
distance-based concentration measures to compare the differences between credit portfolio composition and a 
for diversification. Distance-based diversification measures therefore take the differences in sizes of each sector 
into consideration [10,15]. 
 
certain sectors. Due to the above reason, we choose Herfindhl-Hirschman Index as the basic measure of 
concentration, and also construct a new one based on it, taking systematic risk of each sector into consideration. 
2.1.1 Hirschman-Herfindhl Index (HHI) 
Hirschman-Herfindhl Index (HHI) is a commonly used accepted measure of market concentration. It 
assumes perfect diversification as equal exposure to every sector. 
Before we calculate the concentration measure, for each bank, relative exposure itx  of each sector i  at 
time t  is defined as its nominal exposure itex  divided by the total exposure
1
N
kt
k
ex : 
1
it
it N
kt
k
ex
x
ex
 
(1) 
 
HHI is the sum of the squares of the relative exposures. And thus for each individual bank, it is defined as: 
 
2
1
N
t it
i
HHI x  (2) 
where N is the total number of sectors the banks provide their lending to. The higher HHI value, the less is the 
diversification of the bank.  
2.1.2 Risk-adjusted HHI 
Traditional HHI equals relative exposure of every sector; however, sector itself has different systematic risk 
as the whole economy moves up and down. Lessons learned from banking crises of the 1980s and early 1990s 
taught us that banks should not exposure too much to only few sectors [16]. Subprime crisis was partly due to 
too much exposure to real estate industry which has especially high correlations with macro economy [2]. 
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To adjust systematic risk of each sector, we extend our concentration measurement based on HHI by 
introducing sector betas as weights of relative exposures. We construct new concentration risk-adjusted HHI 
for each bank at time t  as follows: 
risk-adjusted 2
1
N
t it it
i
HHI x  (3) 
 
In Eq (3), it  reflects systematic risk of each sector i  at time t , defined as the covariance between market 
return and sector return cov(R ,R )Mt it  divided by the variance of market return
2
MtR : 
2
cov(R ,R )
=
Mt
Mt it
it
R
 (4) 
 
The high risk-
focused too much on the sectors with higher systematic risk. 
2.2.  Dependent Variables 
In this part, we briefly introduce the dependent variables we use in our regression models. 
 
an ex post measure of t  
2.3. Other Control Variables 
 Asset: we use the continuous variable to measure the size of the bank. In our regression analysis, 
squared term   along with   are also introduced to capture for the potential nonlinear relationship between size 
and risk when the linear relationship is not significant. 
 Loan-to-deposit ratio: total loan divided by total deposit, as the measure of liquidity. 
 Equity ratio: equity divided by the total assets, reflecting the capital structure of the bank. 
2.4. Model Specification 
This topic is to test how loan sectoral concentration impacts risk. We regress risk measure on concentration 
measures in the following equation. Asset, loan-to-deposit ratio and equity ratio are included in the regression 
as control variables. 
 
0 1kt k kt kt ktrisk diversification V  (5) 
 
Where ktrisk  is the risk of bank k  at time t  measured by nonperforming loans. Since we evaluate the 
, absolute value of nonperforming loans is used. ktdiversification is separately 
HHI and risk-adjusted HHI explained in the previous subsection. Finally, kt  is the residual value. 
In our regression analysis, squared term 2ln ( )asset  along with ln( )asset  are also introduced to capture for 
the potential nonlinear relationship between size and risk when the linear relationship is not significant. 
If 1 0 , concentration seems to be less attractive than diversification since risk is higher. Otherwise, 
1 0 means that diversification across sectors brings more risk. 
In addition, we also test the potential nonlinear relationship such as U-shaped or reversed U-shaped 
between credit loan concentration and banks  return by introducing squared term 2ktdiversification  into the 
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regression. 
 
2
0 1 2kt k kt kt kt ktrisk diversification diversification V  (6) 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Sample and Data Source 
In China, there are 16 listed commercial banks. These banks take a large asset proportion of the whole 
banking sector . Our sample includes panel data of all the 16 Chinese listed commercial banks in 2007-2011 
period, 80 observations in total. The 16 commercial banks are: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of 
Communications (BOCOM), China Merchants Bank (CMB), Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (SPDB), 
China Minsheng Banking Corporation (CMBC), China Citic Bank (CITIC), China Everbright Bank (CEBB), 
Industrial Bank Corporation (IBC), Huaxia Bank (HXB), Shenzhen Development Bank (SDB, now is merged 
NJ), and Bank of Ningbo (BNB) . 
These commercial banks began to adopt new accounting new standards in 2007. Besides, in the period of 
2007-2001, Chinese banking sector was developing stably without significant reforms. Therefore, our choice of 
the time period helps to examine the stable relationship between concentration and banks  risk. 
Sector exposures of every listed commercial bank of the five years are from their annual reports. They 
directed their loans to the following sectors: farming, forestry, husbandry and fishing; mining; manufacturing, 
production and supply of electric power, gas and water; construction; transportation and warehousing; 
information technology; wholesale and retail trade; finance and insurance; real estate; social service (including 
science, education and health); communication and culture, etc. Their classification of sectors is mainly in 
accordance with the 13-sector classification standard set by CSRC; therefore, we only adjust some of their 
reported sector loan exposures to ensure consistency between the 16 banks and also the 13-sector classification 
standard. Risk measure is from Wind database
reports. 
3.2.  HHI and Risk-adjusted HHI Calculation 
Definition and classification of sectors in the 16 listed com
differences in some sectors. We adjust the inconsistent ones to ensure that we can compare the calculated HHI 
between the banks and also between the different years. The 16 listed banks all reported their exposures in the 
following sectors: B, C, D, E, F, H, and J. 
banks reported them separately if they provided loans to any of Sector A, G, I, M. Besides, some banks had 
confirmed to 13-
overcome the inconsistency, we adjust our classification standard shown as Table 2. 
Table 2. Adjusted sector classification standard 
No Description Sector code 
I1 mining B 
I2 manufacturing C 
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I3 production and supply of electric power, gas and water D 
I4 construction E 
I5 transportation and warehousing F 
I6 wholesale and retail trade H 
I7 real estate J 
I8 
social services: 
science, education, culture and health 
leasing and business service 
communication and publication 
K,L 
I9 
others: (any, some or all of the following) 
farming, forestry, husbandry and fishing 
information technology 
finance and insurance 
comprehensive industry 
A,G,I,M 
Concerning the most important issue in calculation of risk-adjusted HHI is to estimate sector betas. We 
choose return rate of Shanghai composite index as proxy as market return, which are available in Wind 
database. Wind database also provides indexes of all the 13 sectors in accordance with CSRC standard.  
2
cov(R ,R )
=
Mt
Mt it
it
R
is used to estimate sector betas. Note that we list our results according to CSRC 13-
sector classification. When we introduce the sector betas to calculate risk-adjusted HHI, we do adjustment 
according to our new classification standard. 
Original beta values of Sector B, C, D, E, F, H, and J is used. Average of Sector K and L is replaced with I8 
in our new standard. For I9, we calculate beta of each bank according to the others  
category (one, some or all of Sector A, G, I, M) by averaging their betas. For example, we classify Sector I and 
M for BOC into I9 others , average beta of Sector I and M is used to replace I9 s beta.  
We compare average HHI of Chinese banking sector with the main findings of the previous study. In general 
237 [7] [17] [9 ]in which 
[10] and 0.55 [5] respectively. 
It is easy to find that there is a decreasing tendency of sectoral concentration as HHI reduces with time 
passes. However, risk-adjusted HHI grows sharply in 2011. This may result from more exposure to the sectors 
with higher systematic risk such as real estate, manufacturing and construction, and increased systematic risk of 
these sectors at the same time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Tendency of HHI and risk-adjusted HHI in 2007-2011 
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4. Empirical results 
We present the results of our empirical regression models in this section. Panel data models are used to 
analyze the issue. We test the presence of unit root for the variables including those we are interested and 
control variables, but we reject unit root in all cases. Our sample includes all the Chinese listed commercial 
banks. So it is safe for us to choose fixed effect models for regressions. We also apply Hausman test for all the 
models to validate our choice. 
Our goal is to evaluate the effects of credit portfolio concentration measured by HHI and risk-adjusted HHI 
ratio and the loan-to-deposit ratio. Note that we also try to introduce squared term 2ln ( )asset  along with  
ln( )asset  to describe the potential nonlinear relationship between size and risk when the linear relationship is 
not significant. To capture the potential nonlinear relationship between sectoral concentration and risk, we 
estimate equation with squared term of HHI and risk-adjusted HHI. Table 4 presents the results of regression 
model Eq.(5) and Eq.(6). 
Regarding the portfolio concentration, in the specification Eq.(5), the coefficients for risk-adjusted HHI are 
positive and significant at 5% level to bank s risk both when bank s size is proxied by asset absolute value and 
by squared term 2ln ( )asset  along with ln( )asset . HHI is also positive and significant at 10% level when 
bank s size is described by 2ln ( )asset and ln( )asset . However, in estimation of Eq.(6), significance of 
nonlinear form of HHI and risk-adjusted HHI are both rejected. This suggests that there is no significant 
nonlinear relationship between concentration and risk measure. 
These results provide evidence that portfolio concentration significantly positively related to the bank s risk, 
which is in agreement with the idea of Diamond (1984), stating that the expansion of banks  credit lines to new 
sectors reduced the bank s probability of default. Moreover, concentrated credit portfolio will be vulnerable to 
economic downturns since they only expose themselves to few sectors. The bank risk would be higher if the 
few sectors which the bank exposes to have higher systematic risks, which can be explained by our regression 
results when risk-adjusted HHI is used as concentration measure. 
But our findings contradict the conclusions that concentration reduces risk from other existing research 
works in both developed and developing countries (Acharya, Hasan and Saunders 2006; Kamp, Pfingsten and 
Porath 2005; Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro 2011). 
It can be observed that variable asset itself is not significant in all the four regression models. But when we 
introduce squared term 2ln ( )asset  and ln( )asset  to describe bank s size, their coefficients become significant 
at 1% level, indicating that there exists nonlinear relationship (a reversed U shape at with great probability 
between bank s size and risk.  
5. Conclusion 
We construct a new concentration measure risk-adjusted HHI, taking systematic risk of different sectors 
into consideration by weighting them with their betas. This paper investigates the effects of credit portfolio 
sectoral concentration 
commercial banks during the 2007-2011 period is used for analysis. We also compare the results of our new 
measure to those of more conventional measure HHI.  
previous studies, which may be due to strict regulation and supervision of our country. 
Our main finding of empirical study is that sectoral concentration is associated with higher risk. The reason 
to explain this may be that diversification helps offset the specific risks to achieve lower risks. 
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From the aspect of regulators, it is more important to control risk to ensure financial stability than high 
profits of the banking industry. Therefore, we suggest setting limits on those sectors with higher systematic 
 
Our main contribution is the newly constructed concentration measure, which takes systematic risk of sector 
into consideration. Risk-adjusted HHI performed well to capture the change of systematic risk of sectors and 
exposures to sectors at the same time. We observe that there is a decreasing tendency of HHI in the five years 
in a row, which seems to indicate that credit portfolios are less concentrated. However, the year of 2011 
witnessed a sharp increase in risk-adjusted HHI, suggesting that more exposures to sectors with higher 
systematic risk. The phenomenon should be paid attention to by the regulators, because an increased risk-
adjusted HHI may be a sign of higher risk resulting in more nonperforming loan. This information, however, 
cannot be implied by traditional measure HHI. 
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